The inspector of the Bank of Spain José Antonio Delgado, who has testified today as a witness in the trial for the IPO of Bankia, has said that the entity debuted on the parquet floor in July 2011 with "incorrect information", that "of departure did not reflect reality ", and" with disguised arrears ".
Delgado was responsible for credit risk of the BFA-Bankia Group and executed the review or accounting analysis of the provisions that the entity had before the IPO, and questions from the prosecutor Carmen Luna has reiterated on several occasions that " if the starting information is incorrect ", that the macroeconomic conditions vary is important, but" not fundamental ".
Delgado, who together with José Antonio Casaus, the inspector of the Bank of Spain author of very critical mails with the situation of the group, was responsible for the inspection in Bankia, has come to affirm that the entity was "autoengañaba".
When the analysis of the Bankia accounts corresponding to the 2011 financial year was completed - which the team of former President Rato presented without an audit report and were subsequently reformulated by José Ignacio Goirigolzarri - the inspectors detected various anomalies.
Among them, has highlighted 20,000 million euros that Rato team had accounted for as a normal investment and that in reality, "they were land, that is, disguised delinquency", which is why the Goirigolzarri team had to reformulate the accounts.
The Bank of Spain's team of inspectors met weekly with those responsible for intervening at Bankia, meetings of which there is evidence by José Antonio Casaus, who wrote an email every Friday and reported "the content of the meeting."
In these reports, the content of the analysis is reflected "with greater crudeness" than what was verbally transferred, since "in the reports things are matched, the bosses see them"; the meetings were held with Bankia's intervener, Sergio Durá, and sometimes with his "second" intervention director, José Luis Sánchez Blázquez.
With the external auditor, on the other hand, Delgado never met.
There were operations that were refinanced "up to three times", and with unusual grace periods that appeared as normal, accruing interests in the income statement; hence, in his opinion "the information reflected was incorrect".
He and Casaus, have related, wanted to stop the IPO and avoid the socialization of losses, since the structure of the double bank - one, BFA, and another, Bankia - did not convince them, "it was not the ideal solution".
"It was not that there was a bad bank and a good bank, but a bad one and a worse one", he recalled that Inspector José Antonio Casaus said.
Among other reasons, because the discount applied to the price of the IPO of Bankia made "unfeasible" to BFA.
He has also been very critical of the presence of the former president of Bancaja, José Luis Olivas, as head of internal audit - the director of that department, José Manuel Fernández Norniella, being dependent on him; "It was dangerous that the internal police depended on Olivas", he said, since a large part of the problems came from the Valencian entity.
"Caja Madrid was a dying man, but Bancaja was a dead man," he has sentenced.
With regard to Caja Madrid, he recalled that the entity accumulated retail mortgages to sectors with few resources, which had to add the huge amount of developer land.